Sharing a damage that has been caused jointly by several tortfeasors is analyzed from a normative point of view. We show how a damage can be apportioned on two distinct basis, causation and degree of misconduct. Our analysis uses the concept of potential damage on the basis of which we define a transferable utility game. Its core defines acceptable judgments as allocations of the total damage against which no group of tortfeasors can object. We show that weighted Shapley values define acceptable judgments and, vice versa, acceptable judgments reveal weights. Our paper illustrates how the cooperative approach may bring useful insights into legal questions. In particular, the Shapley value appears of special interest being founded on axioms that are in line with fundamental principles of tort law.
Introduction
Sharing a damage that has been caused by several individuals is a difficult problem that courts often face. Even if there exist basic principles and rules to apportion damages among them (like for instance in the third Restatement of Torts promulgated in May 1999), legal scholars are still looking for a systematic method.
1 Consider the following example due to Landes and Posner (1980) . A car driver hurts a pedestrian who has his leg broken. The victim is then taken to a hospital. There, because of a fault of the surgeon, he has to be amputated. Both the driver and the surgeon have a responsibility in the damage. They have jointly caused the damage since, without the accident, the fault of the surgeon would not have occurred and, without the fault of the surgeon, the pedestrian would not have lost his leg. How should a judge determine the compensation to be paid by each injurer? Should he consider that the driver is liable for the entire damage insofar as without his action the damage would not have occurred? Or that each of them is liable for half of it? Or that one of them is more liable than the other and to what extent? An apportionment rule is needed to correctly share the damage among them. Such litigations occur whenever two or more individuals have jointly caused a damage and it is easy to think about the different fields of law concerned by this issue:
nuisance and environmental law, accident law, medical malpractices, products liability, securities law, antitrust law, etc…
Historically, common law did not accept any apportionment among joint tortfeasors: there was no compensation among those who were regarded as "joint tortfeasors", a rule that had its From an economic point view, some attention has been devoted to this topic since the beginning of the 80's with for instance the contributions of Landes and Posner (1980 ), Rizzo and Arnold (1980 , Shavell (1983) , Cooter (1987) , Kornhauser and Revesz (1989) or Parisi and Singh (2010) . However, no general and clear theoretical agreement has emerged 1 In US jurisprudence, the Restatements of the Law are treatises published by the American Law Institute to inform judges and lawyers about the evolution of common law. 2 See Landes and Posner (1980) for a short and clear history of this topic and Boston (1996) for a detailed study of American common law and statutes evolution.
among economists of law. The aim of the paper is to reconsider the issue of apportionment among multiple tortfeasors in the light of basic economic principles. In contrast to the existing models in law and economics that focus on incentives in a non-cooperative setting, we model apportionment of a damage as a cooperative game where players are the tortfeasors who have jointly created an economic loss that is a priori indivisible. We therefore retain the first objective of tort law, compensation and fairness, and we neglect the second one, incentives.
Fairness, as related to the causal role of each tortfeasor, deserves to be studied within a law and economics framework. Furthermore, incentives concern ex ante causation (how legal rules create incentives for future behaviors) while fairness concerns ex post causation (what tortfeasors have actually caused). We indeed concentrate on ex post causation.
Our method applies to any situation involving multiple causation within a sequence of events:
after a first injury caused by A to the victim, the damage is aggravated by a second tortfeasor B, possibly together with a third one C, etc… 3 We call judgment a specification of the compensation paid by each tortfeasor to the victim. A judgment should be acceptable. There is a minimum compensation: each tortfeasors should pay at least the damage that he or she would have caused alone. This is the notion of "potential" damage that is sometimes used in the legal literature. 4 There is also a maximum compensation: each tortfeasor should pay at most the additional damage that he or she has caused. The additional damage is measured by the difference between the total damage and the damage that would have resulted without the participation of that individual tortfeasor. These two inequalities can actually be found in tort law. 5 Here we go further and extend them from individual tortfeasors to subsets of tortfeasors, leading to the following two conditions:
C1 Keeton (1984, p.353) . 5 The first section of the Uniform Contribution among Tortfeasors Act (1939) states that "no tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his pro rata share" and the third Restatement of Torts states that "no party should be liable for harm it did not cause" (1999, Topic 5) . See also Boston (1996) . equivalent whenever judgments are required to specify an exact allocation of the total damage among the tortfeasors, a restriction that is actually imposed by tort law. The causal distribution is an objective element that results from the work of experts. The weights instead are subjective elements that result from a decision of the judge. In this sense, our approach fits the two-steps method advocated by the third Restatement of Torts, apportionment by causation and apportionment by responsibility.
Liability games have a sequential structure. Like airport games (Littlechild and Owen, 1973) or river games (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002) , they are "consecutive games" as defined by Greenberg and Weber (1986) . Actually, it is shown that liability games are dual of airport games.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The general definition of liability games and acceptable judgments are introduced in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the definition of the characteristic function that emerges from a sequential situation and its consequence in terms of the core and the Shapley values. Concluding remarks are offered in the last section and an appendix gathers some technical results. 6 In game theoretic terms, this condition is called efficiency.
Liability games: generalities
Someone suffers damage. A number of persons are considered to be co-responsible, possibly including the victim who is however entitled to a compensation. The problem is to determine the contribution of each of these persons. In what follows, we will use the term "player" to designate all the actors the judiciary considers to be causally involved in the damage.
A liability game is a transferable utility game ( , ) N v where {1,..., } N n = is the set of players and v is the characteristic function that associates to each coalition S N ⊂ the monetary value ( ) v S of its potential damage.
7 It corresponds to the damage that would have resulted if those outside the coalition had followed a nontortious behavior. This is consistent with the legal reasoning that compares the actual consequences of a behavior with the hypothetical consequences of the "normal" course of events. We take for granted that the judiciary has identified those who are implied in the damage. This is the difference between a legal cause and a material cause. Referring to the example of Landes and Posner (1980) , suppose the pedestrian has been transported to the hospital by an ambulance. Then, even if the driver of the ambulance appears as a material cause in the aggravation, he will not be considered by the law as causally implied and will therefore not be considered as an actor in the game.
For a given game ( , ), N v an allocation is a n-dimensional vector 1 ( ,..., ) n x x that specifies an amount for each player, x i for player i, such that ( ) ( ).
x N v N = 8 Applied to a liability game, x i is the contribution of player i and it is assumed that the total damage ( ) v N is exactly covered. We will consider two solution concepts, namely the core and the Shapley value, in its symmetric and asymmetric versions.
Applied to surplus sharing, the core (Gillies, 1953) is the set of allocations that no coalition can improve upon:
Using the identity ( ) ( ) x N v N = it is easily verified that core allocations satisfy the following equivalent inequalities:
where the right hand side is the additional damage attributable to coalition S. 
For coalitions S, T,… lower-case letters s, t ,… denote their size. 9 The equivalence is lost if one assumes ( ) ( ).
x N v N ≥
Under that weaker assumption, C2 implies C1. The inverse implication is verified if the reverse inequality holds.
Hence the core of a liability game are acceptable judgments, as defined in the introduction: C1 no coalition of players contributes less than its potential damage:
C2 no coalition of players contributes more than its additional damage:
Notice that the above conditions apply to individual players as well:
that is each individual player contributes an amount that is at least equal to his or her potential damage but at most equal to his or her additional damage.
A characteristic function v is convex if and only if:
It is superadditive if the above inequalities apply only to disjoint subsets. Convexity can be equivalently defined in terms of marginal contributions: a characteristic function v is convex if and only if marginal contributions are non-increasing with coalition size:
Being defined by linear inequalities, the core is a convex polyhedron (or polytope), possibly empty, whose dimension is at most n-1. Superadditivity is not sufficient to ensure nonemptiness of the core. 10 However, liability games will be shown to be convex and they have therefore a nonempty core. One then needs a rule (a mapping) ϕ that associates a particular core allocation ( , ) N v ϕ to any given liability game ( , ) . N v When restricted to convex games, the Shapley value is such a rule. It is defined as the average marginal contribution vector: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ,..., ) ( ,..., ) 2,...,
10 Necessary and sufficient conditions for nonemptiness of the core have been obtained independently by Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) . Shapley (1953) has shown that it is the only linear allocation rule that is symmetric (equals are treated equally) and satisfies the null player property (null players get zero). 11 Alternative axiomatizations have been given. We will rely on the one proposed by Young (1985) In general, the core is a subset of the Weber set defined as the convex hull of the marginal contributions vectors, a result due to Weber (1988) , and the two sets coincide on the cone of convex games. 13 The set of weighted values is clearly a subset of the Weber set. Monderer, 11 Two players are equal in a game if they contribute equally to all coalitions to which they both belong. A player is null in a game if he or she contributes to no coalition. 12 It was introduced by Shapley (1953) . See Kalai and Samet (1987) for a complete characterization. See Dehez (2011) for an axiomatization in a cost sharing framework. 13 It is actually a necessary and sufficient condition for convexity. See Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981) . Samet and Shapley (1992) have shown that, in general, the core is a subset of the set of weighted values. Consequently, the core coincides with the set of weighted values. This is a key property for liability games. It means that an acceptable judgment consists in assigning weights to players: the resulting allocation defines an acceptable judgment and weights can be associated to any acceptable judgment. The characteristic function is computed in terms of potential damages on the basis of objective elements. The choice of weights instead forms the subjective part of a judgment that is based on the severity of the misconduct or negligence.
Liability games: characterization

The characteristic function
We will analyze situations that are sequential in the sense that the sequence of wrongful acts that has resulted in the injury has been identified, knowing that, along the sequence, some players may be jointly responsible for the aggravation of the damage. By jointly we mean that no additional damage would have occurred if any one of them had not been present. More precisely, a liability situation is described by the set of players 14 An individual is included as a player in the sequence if he or she is considered to have caused an aggravation of the damage (not necessarily immediate) resulting from a wrongdoing. If a player has caused no immediate aggravation, that player is included in the T h preceeding him or her in the sequence. (1) (12) (13) (12) and ( (1) (12) (13) (14) (124) (134) ( 123) and ( 
As mentioned in the introduction, liability games belong to the class of consecutive games.
We actually have the following proposition:
Lemma 2 Liability games are dual of airport game.
The proof is given in Appendix A1 for the pure sequential case.
The core
The problem is to allocate the total damage among the n players, which means finding a If the victim is held partially liable for the damages incurred, he or she is one of the players somewhere along the sequence. His or her contribution is then simply deducted from the total damage to define the actual compensation received and the total compensation paid by the tortfeasors is then less than the damage.
Recalling the definition
 the core as defined in (1) can be written as:
( , ) ( ) and for all 1,...,
We observe that the core imposes to the players in T 1 to pay at least their immediate damage:
Actually, the core includes the allocation that imposes to the players in T 1 to pay for the entire damage:
It also includes the allocation that imposes to each group of players to pay for its additional damage:
( 1,..., ) 
( , , 0, ) 
It then remains to apply additivity to get the result. ♦ In Example 1, the weighted value and the symmetric value are given respectively by: The set of all weighted values is obtained by a limit argument, letting some w i 's go to zero.
Zero and nonzero weight players can be treated separately. What a nonzero-weight player receives coincides with the weighted value of the game restricted to the set of nonzero-weight players. What remains is then allocated among zero-weight players. That allocation may however not be uniquely defined in the case of more than one zero weight players. (1985) because it fits better our legal framework. Efficiency retains only the rules that allocate exactly the total damage among the tortfeasors (except of course when the victim is coresponsible). Symmetry retains only the rules that allocate an identical amount to players who contribute equally to the potential damage of any coalition to which they belong. Marginalism retains only the rule that imposes to players to pay an amount that depends exclusively on their contributions to potential damages, independently of the way the other players contribute.
In tort law, the apportionment of damage among multiple tortfeasors is one of the most difficult problems that judges face. The cooperative game approach followed here turns out to
give useful insights into that problem by eliciting the rationality of legal decisions and making clear what are the normative properties that underlie those judgments. In particular, it fits the two-steps method advocated by third Restatement of Tort Law, apportionment by causation and apportionment by responsibility. In this way we have illustrated how the axiomatic approach may be useful in solving legal problems and, more generally, understanding the law.
We have successively: 
A.2 The nucleolus of a 3-player liability game
Like the Shapley value, the nucleolus is translation invariant. Hence we may assume d 1 = 0. It is also a symmetric rule. That makes the computation of the nucleolus easier because it defines an allocation that can be written in terms of a single parameter The least core, formally introduced by Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1979) , extends the notion of ε-core introduced earlier by Shapley and Shubik (1966) .
